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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Pension reform is a subject of hot debate all around the world.2 Over the last years, the world 
has witnessed a marked increase in public awareness about the need for retirement income 
planning. Struck by the looming financial crisis of most public retirement income programs, 
individuals and governments alike have started to give the retirement income issue a second 
look. The recommendations of public and private financial advisors generally involve some 
form of private retirement savings, be it at the level of the individual or the workplace. The 
motivation for these common recommendations lies in the considerable projected financial 
problems of the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems in the decades to come, once the 
baby-boomers enter retirement. 
 
The basic demographic process is fundamentally the joint product of two different, though 
clearly related phenomena. It affects the population structure both at the bottom and the top. 
To start with the beginning of a person’s life-cycle, a substantial decrease in the fertility rate 
has been observed in all developed countries. Though the same is not (yet) universally 
observable in the entire developing world, the very same fundamental process seems to be at 
work. In the most recent world population projections, the UN considers that even in a high 
fertility scenario all less developed regions would fall to a fertility level that is significantly 
lower than the currently observed one (see Table 1). 
 
The reasons for a decrease in the number of childbirths per woman have to be sought at 
multiple levels. The onset of a slowdown in fertility rates usually goes hand in hand with 
strongly decreasing child mortality. In later stages of the process, other factors such as 
increased female labor force participation play an increasing role and lead to later childbirth 
as well as to increased monetary and nonmonetary costs of children. 
 
 
                                                 
2 In the present paper, I refer to the term Social Security as the retirement portion of the U.S. Social Security 
program, which represents the predominant public pension system in the United States. The term social 
insurance is used as a short-cut for all public insurance programs such as retirement, unemployment, disability 
and (often) health insurance. 
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Table 1. Total Fertility, Under Different Scenarios 
 
 
 Total Fertility (Children per woman) 
   2045–50 
Major area 1970–75 2000–05 Low Medium High Constant 
       
World 4.49  2.65 1.56 2.05 2.53 3.50 
       
More developed regions 2.12  1.56 1.34 1.84 2.34 1.67 
Less developed regions 5.44  2.90 1.59 2.07 2.56 3.69 
     Least developed countries 6.61  5.02 2.08 2.57 3.05 5.56 
     Other less developed 
countries 5.28  2.58 1.42 1.92 2.41 3.06 
       
Africa 6.72  4.97 2.03 2.52 3.00 5.50 
Asia 5.08 2.47 1.42 1.91 2.41 2.98 
Europe 2.16  1.40 1.33 1.83 2.33 1.45 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 5.05  2.55 1.36 1.86 2.36 2.69 
Northern America 2.01  1.99 1.35 1.85 2.35 1.99 
Oceania 3.23  2.32 1.42 1.92 2.42 2.72 
       
 
   Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations 





The second and equally important demographic factor at play is the remarkable increase in 
life-expectancy we have witnessed in the last decades. Though originally clearly playing at 
young ages, there has been a tendency towards something that is commonly referred to as the 
rectangularization of the survival curve, i.e., the fact that gains in life expectancy are realized 
all across the age spectrum.3 Table 2 summarizes the key trends for different regions of the 
world.  
                                                 
3 An interesting and equally important question is to know how much of that added life-span is actually spent in 
good health. This question is of an utmost importance within the context of long-term care issues. Considering 
long-term care insurance, it is crucial to be aware not only of the projected increases in longevity but also of the 
time that a person would be expected to be in need of care. 
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Table 2. Life Expectancy at Birth, 2000–05 and 2045–50 
 
Major area 2000–05 2045–50 
World 65.4 75.1 
   
More developed regions 75.6 82.1 
Less developed regions 63.4 74.0 
      Least developed countries 51.0 66.5 
      Other less developed countries 66.1 76.3 
   
Africa 49.1 65.4 
Asia 67.3 77.2 
Europe 73.7 80.6 
Latin America and Caribbean 71.5 79.5 
Northern America 77.6 82.7 
Oceania 74.0 81.2 
   
 
   Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social affairs of 
the United Nations Secretariat (2005); World Population Prospects: The 2004 
Revision Highlights (New York: United Nations). 
 
 
These two concomitant trends have a major impact on most social insurance programs 
around the world. In most countries, social insurance programs rely on PAYG financing not 
only for their retirement programs, but also frequently for their disability, health, and 
unemployment accident programs. In a PAYG system, the above demographic trends have a 
clear impact. All other things equal, as the expenditures of the system increases as the 
number of beneficiaries rises, there is a simultaneous decrease in the revenues and the 
number of people contributing to the system. 
 
The resulting policy implications for assuring the viability of the system in the face of an 
aging process are equally easy to grasp. Though there is a myriad of ways that policymakers 
can react, all of these policies can be summarized to a simple observation of a need for 
benefit cuts to current and future retirees or contribution hikes for current and future workers. 
The most obvious, but politically rather unattractive, option would be to introduce explicit 
benefit cuts or contribution hikes to the system. Next to this, there are a series of other 
measures that achieve the same ultimate goal, such as a widening of the contributory base, or 
restrictions in terms of the eligibility for benefits. A commonly recommended measure, 




But beyond the sheer size of the demographic problems ahead, pensions are also a topic 
where everybody seems to have some opinions on what a reform should do. This is maybe 
surprising given that many people actually lack a fundamental idea of what the current 
systems—as a point of departure—represent to them. Börsch-Supan and others (2005) 
document that among a sample of German and Italian citizens, about 50 percent believe that 
reforms undertaken so far were just a first step towards stabilization. 40 percent of those 
surveyed believed that the reforms were ineffective. At the same time, approximately 
60 percent of those surveyed did not understand the PAYG basis of the respective pension 
systems, while a huge 80 percent did not know the contribution rate to the respective system. 
Similar evidence exists for other countries.4  
 
The reasons for this situation are simple. It is a multi-factor problem with big stakes for all 
parties involved, be it the citizens, the government, or the corporate and financial 
communities. Indeed, whatever choice a country makes in terms of its pension system, it is 
clearly not neutral with respect to the distributional impact, but also the allocative efficiency 
of the economy. The distributional impact includes both intergenerational and 
intragenerational considerations. While the point might at first seem rather obvious, a closer 
look reveals rather complex shifts both in terms of income and in terms of risks across 
generations and within generations. 
 
As a whole, the study of retirement behavior, as well as retirement income programs is a 
well-trodden area, both in the public finance and labor economics literature on the one hand, 
and in financial economics on the other. The general theoretical mechanisms at stake are by 
now well documented. On the empirical side, the research used to have a distinct U.S. focus, 
given the readily available data. Over the last few years, European countries have made 
substantial efforts to improve their datasets, both administrative and survey-based.5 As a 
result, a fresh wave of international and comparative research projects has emerged. A 
particular line of research has emphasized the retirement incentives generated by public 
social insurance systems as well as the impact of reforms in terms of budgets, retirement 
behavior and well-being (Gruber and Wise 1999, 2004, 2005).  
 
The present primer on pensions and pension reform attempts to survey the key ingredients 
and factors that are inevitably touched upon in any pension debate. The paper uses selected 
topics from the recent U.S. Social Security reform debate as a useful real world reference.6 
However, instead of pretending to give a comprehensive treatment of the reform debate, the 
paper deliberately relies on a selective treatment of and a special emphasis on a few topics 
                                                 
4 See for example Schokkaert and others (2000) for the Belgian Region of Flanders. 
5 See for example the creation of the comprehensive Crossroads Bank for Social Security that integrates all 
social insurance relevant administrative data in Belgium (ksz-bcss.fgov.be) as well as the Survey of Health 
Aging and Retirement in Europe (www.share-project.org). 
6 For a more complete outline of the Bush administration 2005 reform proposal, see 
www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security/200501/socialsecurity.pdf. 
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that are frequently willingly or unwillingly left out of the debate. The structure of the paper 
mirrors this approach. The next section spells out the key aspects of the 2005 United States 
reform proposal with a special focus on the Personal Retirement Accounts. Section 3 
positions the debate by describing the underlying justifications for the existence of pension 
schemes. Section 4 reviews the validity of the reform proposal focusing on some classical 
motivations for reform of public pension schemes. Section 5 spells out some further key 
design issues and draws on international and private sector experiences to address them. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
II.   THE SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM PROPOSAL 
A.   Summary 
In February 2005, the President of the United States unveiled a reform proposal to make the 
Social Security system, i.e., the public social insurance based pension system, ready for the 
challenges of the 21st century. Starting with a postulate of inadequacy of the current system, 
which has been in place since the 1930’s, the proposal intends to fundamentally change the 
architecture of the system with an announced objective of strengthening the system. In the 
above-mentioned White House document, the transition is actually not discussed further. In 
what follows, I will thus largely rely on the original comprehensive reform plan that was 
proposed by Robert Pozen. 7 
 
The key features of the reform proposal can be summarized as follows. Under the proposal, 
the total contributions rate is maintained at the current level of 12.4 percent of taxable 
earnings (employer and employee portion of social security taxes). Benefit entitlements 
would be scaled down by two mechanisms. First, there would be a partial shift from wage-to-
price indexation in the benefit formula. The measure would mostly impact on higher income 
earners, and thus de facto lead to a reinforcement of the implicit redistribution towards low-
income workers. Second, under the proposal a system of Personal Retirement Accounts 
(PRA)—a simple variant of an individual account system—would be introduced. Workers 
would be entitled to divert part of their payroll taxes on a voluntary basis into the PRA. In 
what follows, the paper focuses on this second mechanism the effects whereof are less well 
understood than the former.  
 
B.   PRA 
Participation in the PRA plan is a one off option granted to each worker, with no way back. 
Ultimately, the plan would allow individuals to divert payroll taxes of up to 4 percent to the 
new accounts. Maintaining a system of tax deductibility rather than savings incentives 
through tax credits has to be seen as a political choice in favor of higher-income individuals 
                                                 
7 Other proposals circulate. For a review of their budgetary implications for Social Security, visit 
www.ssa.gov/OACT/solvency/index.html. 
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who benefit more from tax deductibility than people in lower-income brackets because of 
differing marginal income tax rates. 
 
PRA are special savings accounts, in the sense that money accumulates in them, and balances 
accrued can be inherited and passed on to others. They would enable people to have some 
influence on the investments that are made using the money in the PRA. PRA’s would 
however not give individuals a full decision right on the use of the funds. First, the money 
would be locked into the account up to retirement. Second, individuals would only have a 
choice among a series of pre-approved low-cost and broad-based investment vehicles. Along 
more traditional products, the proposal aims to introduce two new products, a life-cycle 
portfolio that gradually shifts away from stocks into bonds as a person ages and a secure 
government bond fund with a guaranteed rate of return above inflation.  
 
The PRA would be modeled on the structure of the U.S. Thrift Savings Plan (TSP). For 
federal government employees TSP are the equivalent to the 401(k) plans of the private 
sector. The main distinct features are a centralized structure for collecting contributions, 
reduced management and administration costs by pre-selecting a limited number of 
investment funds, and pre-selection of information about withdrawal strategies.8 Under the 
PRA, the accumulated pension savings could be withdrawn in a variety of ways on or after 
retirement. Annuity purchases and phased withdrawal plans are one broad class of options, 
lump-sum withdrawals is the other one.9 The latter option would only be admissible if the 
person does not drop below the income poverty line, i.e., if he has sufficient other periodic 
incomes to assure he stays above the mentioned limit. 
  
The system would also contain a grandfathering rule, making sure that the system does not 
change benefits promised for those born before 1950. The economic reasoning behind this 
grandfathering rule is simple. People have planned according to a given set of rules. Given 
their relatively high age (above 55), they do not have a sufficiently long horizon over which 
they could readjust to the reform, notably by optimally readapting their labor supply and 
savings behavior. Hence, any absence of grandfathering would de facto be economically 
equivalent to a lump-sum tax on them. Similarly, benefit changes for younger cohorts would 
have to be phased in progressively, for the very same reason. 
 
The reform would necessitate major government borrowing during a prolonged transition 
period to offset the reduced contributions to Social Security. The magnitude and duration of 
this transitory borrowing would be a function of the number of people subscribing to the new 
PRA arrangement. The reason for this additional government borrowing is due to the timing 
mismatch between costs and benefits of the reform for the public finances. The current Social 
Security system is predominantly organized along the PAYG principle, whereas the new 
PRA is essentially a private funded retirement savings vehicle. Public finances thus suffer 
                                                 
8 In line with IRA and 401(k) rules, limited withdrawals are possible before retirement. 
9 See Reno and others (2005) for a detailed discussion of issues relating to annuitization, such as survivor, 
spousal and other dependent benefits. 
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from an immediate income loss due to lower payroll tax revenue as soon as the first person 
opts out of the system. The benefits to the public budgets are the lowered future expenses 
resulting from a reduction in Social Security benefit payouts as a result of the individuals’ 
choice for the PRA savings accounts.  
 
These future claims of the public sector can take two different forms. The first and most 
important one would come from an offset against Social Security retirement and aged 
survivor benefits for those who participate in the PRA.10 The offset an individual would face 
would be computed in three steps. A hypothetical benefit entitlement would be determined 
based on the workers earnings history as if he had not participated in the PRA scheme. Then, 
the PRA contributions (including inherited ones) would be discounted to the age of 
retirement using a real—beyond consumer price inflation—discount rate of 3 percent to form 
the fictive present discounted value of the PRA. It is important to stress that this present 
discounted value is completely independent of the actually observed balance in the account, 
which might be higher, but also lower than the above fictive amount. The fictive amount is 
then finally converted into a fictive annuity payout stream, the offset amount, which again 
relies on a 3 percent real interest rate, and on up-to-date life tables. The offset amount 
represents the sum that is subtracted from a PRA participant’s monthly Social Security 
benefit as a consequence of the person’s participation in the PRA, and thus represents lower 
future public expenditures. On the individual level, it is economically equivalent to the 
reimbursement of a fixed-rate loan that would have been contracted to do PRA savings. As 
such, the PRA does not affect the individual’s (minimum) benefit entitlements under Social 
Security rules, but rather affects the disposable income of the individual once the PRA-
payouts minus the offset have been taken into account. 
 
The second public income source helping to finance the transition is a similar mechanism 
which kicks in when an individual dies before retiring. The original Pozen plan includes such 
a provision for single individuals who die before retirement, but the administration seems not 
to plan to go down this route. In this case, the balance of the PRA would be reduced by a 
similarly computed present discounted value to compensate for the earlier deviation of part 
of the payroll taxes to the PRA. Hence, the net amount a single individual will be able to 
bequeath will be the difference between the accumulated PRA balance and the PDV of 
contributions diverted from the Social Security system.  
 
Absent a fully symmetric claw-back mechanism for death before and after retirement, any 
system de facto performs a reverse annuitization. To express it a bit differently, a worker 
pays for the acquisition of present inheritable wealth (in the present case the PRA balance) 
with future contingent claims (namely theoretical Social Security benefits). This process 
raises interesting economic and legal questions. On the economic front, a system allowing for 
imperfect clawback in case of death before retirement gives individuals yet another tool to 
shift future resources towards the present in a manner akin to mortgages and home equity 
loans. From a legal perspective, it is interesting to know whether such borrowing against 
                                                 
10 For a brief discussion on offsetting, see Gustman and Steinmeier (2005). 
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Social Security is actually coherent with present day limitations on borrowing on future 
Social Security payments. 
 
 
III.   PENSIONS: THE BASICS 
Fundamentally, old-age pensions can be defined as periodic payments made on retirement or 
above some specified age. Old-age pension systems may provide insurance against an entire 
array of risks such as the risks of uncertain length of life and working life, loss of purchasing 
power and investment risk.  
 
A.   Longevity Risk and the Role of Annuities 
Pension plans have the potential to insure people against the double risk of increased life 
expectancy and uncertain time of death by providing individuals with annuities that pay 
benefits until the end of a person’s life, so called life annuities.11 In his seminal paper, 
Yaari (1965) showed that absent any bequest motive, an individual life-cycle saver would 
like to fully annuitize his wealth rather than keep it under the form of savings. Annuities 
allow individuals to focus their financial resources on the states of the world in which they 
are alive.  
 
The economic rationale behind this observation is rather straightforward. The basic life-cycle 
model without bequest motives tells us that individuals want to have a continuous real flow 
of consumption to attain the highest possible utility level, a result known as consumption 
smoothing. With no life-span and no price uncertainty, the result is pretty easy to attain as 
individuals simply have to optimally split their lifetime resources among the different 
consumption periods. When introducing life-span uncertainty, individuals no longer want to 
hold their lifetime wealth under the form of savings, but rather under the form of annuities, 
and this from the very beginning of their life. This process is referred to in the literature as 
continuous annuitization. In the presence of a joy-of-giving bequest motive, Jousten (2001) 
showed how the intrinsic value of the annuity contract to the individual decreases. The paper 
showed that it is only for extreme values of the bequest motive that individuals lose their 
strict preference of annuities over pure savings products in favor of a simple indifference 
between the two types of products. For other formalizations of the bequest motives similar—
though less categorical results—can be derived with some room left for pure savings 
products. Hence, from a policy point of view, annuities should continue to play a key role in 
any retirement program. Pure savings products with either lump-sum or phased withdrawal 
strategies are inadequate tools to ensure coverage against the risk of uncertain death, unless 
the individuals have other tools at their disposal. One such tool is informal risk sharing along 
the lines of Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) who suggested that informal risk pooling within a 
family can be a viable alternative to formal annuitization.  
 
                                                 
11 Mackenzie (2005) provides an extensive discussion of the concept of annuities and the different forms they 
take in the real world. 
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The logic of annuitization is actually not limited to the post-retirement period. In this sense, 
the uncertainty on the length of the life would tend to argue in favor of an annuity-based 
pension system that annuitizes contributions as they appear, instead of accumulating these 
contributions in a savings vehicle until retirement, and then converting them all at once into 
an annuity stream. Most public retirement programs belong to the continuous annuitization 
type, while private pension schemes usually rely on one-off annuitization at retirement or a 
fixed age. By doing so, private pension plan participants give up a certain degree of 
protection against longevity risk. 
 
In the same spirit of life-cycle optimization, it should be stressed that the key objectives are 
expressed in real terms. Indexed annuities best suit this definition, in the sense that they do 
not only shelter the individual against longevity risk, but also against purchasing power 
erosion. Nominal annuities are in this sense a strictly dominated product, as they expose the 
individual to end-of-life loss of purchasing power. Broadly speaking, two indexing strategies 
are imaginable. The first obeys a pure logic of simple protection against purchasing power 
loss by means of indexing benefits to the trend of the consumer price index, or some other 
more targeted price index. The second logic involves indexation to wages. Keeping the 
starting level of benefits constant, wage indexation implies that beneficiaries of such 
pensions are granted a share of the gains in productivity realized by the current working 
generation. Expressed differently, price indexation guarantees some absolute level of 
consumption that will remain available to retirees, while wage indexation of benefits implies 
a steady relative position of retirees with respect to the working aged population.  
 
B.   The Notion of Actuarial Neutrality 
Besides the risk of longevity, individuals also face uncertainty with respect to the end of their 
working life. Likely causes are health conditions that either force people to leave the labor 
market or at the very least make it costly and undesirable to keep on working. Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1978, 1986) study the case of workers forced to retire early due to the 
unpredictable onset of a disability. In their setting, truly disabled people cannot be separated 
from those purely claiming to be disabled. They show that the optimal retirement program 
implies benefits rising with the age at which one starts to draw benefits, but by less than the 
actuarially neutral adjustment. The intuition for this result is strikingly simple. The desire to 
ensure a sufficient income level to those who are forced into an early withdrawal from the 
labor force implies a relatively more favorable treatment of this group with respect to people 
retiring late. Hence, the slope of benefits as a function of age has to be lower than what it 
would be if the system were run according to simple accounting principles on an 
individualized basis. It is worth noticing that the above theoretical finding runs counter to an 
often proclaimed desirability of an actuarially neutral pension system on the margin of 
retirement.  
 
As a matter of fact, actuarial characteristics are often mentioned in pension-related 
discussions. However, there seems to be some confusion on the different terms. Economists 
and policymakers alike often erroneously use the term actuarial neutrality as a substitute for 
actuarial fairness. The two terms—both borrowed from the world of the actuarial sciences—
are however not the same. The term actuarial neutrality describes situations where a decision 
is neutral with respect to the actuarial or expected present discounted value of a financial 
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flow over time. The question of actuarial neutrality is a multidimensional problem, as it 
comes up along every single margin of maneuver that an individual faces. 
 
A pension system is, thus, defined as being actuarially neutral at the retirement margin when 
the net present discounted value of benefits—measured at any given point in time—is 
unaffected by the decision to retire at age X rather than at some reference age Y. More 
precisely, the margin of maneuver is the simultaneous decision to retire from active working 
life and enter into recipiency of retirement benefits provided by some pension system. The 
situation of a simultaneous retirement and benefit claiming decision is by far the most 
commonly observed one in the real world, but it is not the only possible one as the two 
decisions can easily be separated into a two-step procedure. Coile and others (2002), for 
example, studied the question of whether there might be an incentive to delay claiming of 
retirement benefits after the departure out of the labor force. The authors' analysis shows that 
for some sub-groups of the population, there might be rather powerful financial incentives 
pushing individuals to optimally divert from this simultaneous retirement and claiming 
decision. In this spirit, a system is said to be actuarially neutral along the claiming margin 
when the net present discounted value of benefits conditioning on a constant age of 
retirement is unchanged when considering different claiming dates. Yet another form of 
actuarial neutrality of a pension system relates to the margin of additional earnings at any 
given point in time of one’s working life. For this latter margin, the relevant domain is the 
entire earnings space where workers have a positive elasticity of labor supply. 
 
A system is called actuarially fair, if the expected present discounted value of benefits net of 
contributions over the entire lifecycle equals zero. Hence, a system—both public and private 
—can be actuarially neutral along the margins discussed above without being actuarially fair 
at the same time. Similarly, a system can be actuarially fair at a given age of retirement, 
without however being actuarially neutral on the margin of retirement.  
 
In the presence of individual heterogeneity along socio-economic and demographic 
dimensions, it is easy to show that the only way of having both an actuarially neutral and fair 
stand-alone pension system is to have a system that is perfectly individualized along those 
individual characteristics. If the system stops short of perfect individualization, some people 
will necessarily either face distortions along a given margin of maneuver, or be affected by 
positive or negative net infra-marginal transfers, hence either violating actuarial neutrality or 
actuarial fairness. 
 
C.   Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans 
The distinction between defined benefit and defined contribution plans touches one of the 
core ingredients of a pension arrangement. There is however no unique definition of these 
concepts. In most of the public economics literature the emphasis is put on the extent to 
which the contribution as opposed to the benefit formula is fixed under the pension 
arrangement. A pure defined contribution (DC) plan contains no other promise relating to the 
accumulation phase, nor does it contain any obligation of result at retirement, or later. Pure 
defined benefit (DB) plans contain benefit promises expressed either in absolute or in relative 
terms. According to this definition, the identity of the entity granting this guarantee does not 
matter.  
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More recently, the OECD proposed a somewhat more targeted definition.12 The motivation 
for this new definition is based in the special situations that arise in occupational pension 
plans, particularly in the face of increased accounting requirement on behalf of pension plan 
sponsors. According to this OECD definition, DC plans correspond to plans where the 
contribution is the only parameter that is guaranteed by the employer in the case of an 
occupational plan, or the state in the case of a public plan. DB plans are according to this 
second definition all plans that are not DC, and hence include some sort of promise in terms 
of the benefits that are payable in the future.13 
 
Disclosure requirements, good practice, and limited risk considerations of DC plans are 
conceptually similar to those of any kind of investment fund. Strictly informative and 
nonbinding projections of benefits at retirement are often the only “retirement”-specific note. 
DB plans are technically more difficult to administer than pure DC plans, both from the point 
of view of the employer and from that of the fund administrator. DB plans have to keep 
funding levels and solvency at sufficient levels in order to be able to fulfill the ultimate 
benefit promise at or after retirement. There is an important role for actuarial calculations and 
specific investment and liability management to select the types of investment and the 
maturity of the assets such that they match with the projected pension benefits liabilities. 
 
The distinction between DB and DC plans extends well beyond pure definitional 
considerations.14 They translate into very different benefit structures, with fundamentally 
different outcomes in terms of risk. Several types of risk are affected. In a pure DC plan, it is 
the individual or a group of plan participants that ultimately ends up bearing both the risk of 
longevity and the investment risk prior to and after retirement. In pure DB plans, on the other 
hand, these two types of risk are generally entirely borne by the employer, the pension fund 
or the state (as guarantor).15 Individuals are, thus, theoretically protected against any kind of 
fluctuation in terms of the underlying returns earned on the pension asset and the changes in 
life expectancy.16 In between these two extremes, there is an array of different situations, 
which involve different risk-sharing rules. An example of an impure DB plan would be the 
case of a pension benefit that corresponds to fixed contributions with a fixed or minimum 
rate of return on lifetime contributions guaranteed by the plan sponsor. Similarly, such a rate 
of return guarantee could be used for determining a minimum pension benefit under a 
                                                 
12 When referring to a pension plan, I consider it as a legally binding contract having an explicit retirement 
objective. For occupational plans, the plan sponsor is often the employer or a group of employers. A pension 
fund is one possible funding vehicle of a pension plan. 
13 See Yermo (2002). 
14 See Heller (1998) for a discussion of some risk considerations relating to the choice between DC and DB. 
15 Heller (2004) presents an interesting discussion of the risk exposure of governments as a result of explicit and 
implicit contingent liabilities. One example of the latter derives from the government’s likely inability to stay 
on the sidelines in the face of a major crisis in the (nonguaranteed) private pensions market. 
16 Extreme shocks are however likely to affect individuals even in a pure DB environment as guarantees by the 
company or the state may become too costly to bear. 
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conventional DB system.17 An impure DC system could, for example, guarantee a fixed or a 
minimum rate of return. Any such guarantee will ultimately be collectively borne by plan 
members. 
 
D.   PAYG and the Accounting of Public Pensions 
Independently of the previous categorizations, pension systems can be classified as being 
either PAYG or fully-funded, depending on the way benefits are funded. In a pure fully-
funded or capitalization system, the contributions of today’s working generation are saved 
and invested to ensure that same generation’s retirement needs are met tomorrow. In a 
capitalization scheme, there is no explicit intergenerational redistribution taking place. The 
only form in which income is distributed is according to the ownership of factors of 
production. Hence, the elderly are earning income because they are the owners of the 
productive assets that the young are working with. 
  
In a pure PAYG system on the other hand, today’s contributions are used to pay for today’s 
benefits, hence operating without financial assets and reserves. Most public pension schemes 
around the world approximate the concept of a PAYG system. As such, these pension 
schemes do not have any assets to back any future benefit claims based on past and current 
contributions. PAYG pensions, thus, fundamentally rely on an explicit intergenerational 
solidarity, as all benefit entitlements are purely implicit. 
 
As a result, it is, thus, not surprising that accounting for the various kinds of pension 
liabilities is a contentious topic. There is a long running debate on the accounting of pension 
liabilities incurred by the public sector. Holzmann and others (2004) propose a taxonomy of 
measures of pension liabilities. Two elements play a key role in understanding the lack of a 
coherent approach to the question. First, promised future pension payments under a public 
PAYG pension system do not completely appear in official government statistics (Oksanen 
2004, Lequiller 2004). Together with promised health care and long-term care payments, 
they represent a major component of the concept known as implicit public debt (IPD).18 The 
pension-related IPD is defined as the present value of pension rights accrued up to a given 
date by workers and pensioners. The reason for this absence of accounting is rather 
straightforward and basically comes down to the very substance of these future streams: 
these are promised payments, maybe even called entitlements. But they often stop short of 
being legally enforceable claim on future resources. Expressed differently, future pension 
payments are a particular kind of public debt, because they are implicit by nature and they 
are often easier to renege on. The Italian Dini and Amato reforms that considerably reduced 
future benefit payout streams are probably the best known examples in terms of the effect on 
the implicit debt level.19  
                                                 
17 In the U.S. context, cash balance plans are an example of impure DB with a fixed rate of return guaranteed by 
the employer. In Belgium, all DB company pensions have to guarantee a minimum return on the contributions 
paid. 
18 See Heller (2004). 
19 See most notably Beltrametti (1996). 
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Absent any such legal differentiation, it can easily be shown that the implicit debt of a 
PAYG-based social insurance system and explicit public debt are perfectly equivalent from a 
purely economic point of view, and hence should be treated similarly. 
 
E.   Why Public Intervention? 
Public intervention can take a variety of forms, and goes well beyond a purely binary 
decision between a completely private and a completely public retirement income system. In 
this respect, it is helpful to slice down the retirement scheme into the different functions that 
it fulfills, and consider whether public intervention is useful at any of the stages considered. 
To start off with, there is the question of membership in the program, which can be 
completely left to private decisionmakers or put under public scrutiny. Second, there is the 
question of whether the financial inflows into, and outflows out of the system are fully under 
private control, or whether some public institution or administration should be put in charge 
of either one of those. Third, there is the question of knowing which role should be reserved 
to the public and the private sectors in the management of the collected resources, as well as 
in what type of assets these resources would be invested. In this context, it is perfectly 
imaginable to have a private fund management of an otherwise public pension scheme. 
Fourth, there is the question of what role the government should play in terms of regulating 
the behavior of private actors, as well as what kind of reinsurance protection or other 
guarantees the public sector might be able to provide for an otherwise private system. 
 
At this stage, it should already be stressed that any of the below reasons for private market 
failure have to be seen as necessary conditions for public intervention, but by no means as 
sufficient conditions. There is fundamentally no reason why a government would necessarily 
be better equipped to deal with any of the below limitations, and thus it is only to the degree 
that the public authorities have better tools at hand that there might be a role for public 
intervention.  
 
Redistribution. All aspects discussed so far do not involve a stringent role for the 
government or the public sector more generally. However, when looking at the real world, 
public intervention abounds. An obvious first motivation for such intervention might be a 
desire to redistribute income. Whereas any insurance scheme necessarily involves some 
ex post redistribution between individuals, there might be a desire to go one step further and 
also redistribute resources between different individuals on an ex ante basis. 
 
Adverse selection. Adverse selection arises when heterogeneous individuals have a 
possibility to hide their true characteristics and take strategic actions. Adverse selection is a 
classical problem of asymmetric information and examples of adverse selection abound all 
across the insurance industry. As such, the fundamental problem that pension plans face and 
those of any other kind of insurance contract are no different.  
 
Adverse selection generally leads to an economic outcome that has to be qualified as 
suboptimal, either because markets fail to exist or because they operate with incomplete 
coverage for some risk groups. The reason is simple. Individuals will be able to exploit their 
informational advantage when confronted with any pricing strategy. Using British data, 
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Cocco and Lopes (2004) present empirical evidence that individual characteristics play a key 
role in the choices made among different public and private retirement plans and thus 
illustrate the relevance of such considerations for pension systems.  
 
Remedies for adverse selection are well-known. On the one hand, there are remedies that 
attack the roots of the problem by attempting to improve the information available to the 
insurer. The most common example is the medical checkup that life insurers often require 
prior to signing a new contract. On the other hand, there are policies that restrict individuals’ 
abilities to adversely select into a different risk group. In this line of thought, compulsory 
coverage under a group pension scheme for all workers of a given company, or for all 
citizens of a country may play this role. Such compulsory membership usually comes at a 
cost, as people are forced to participate at average annuity rates rather than risk-group 
specific rates. It is thus ultimately a question of evaluating the costs versus the benefits of 
such a policy. Eckstein and others (1985) showed that there is a clear welfare improving 
potential for a compulsory pension scheme. Their result does not, however, imply that a 
public retirement system replaces or eliminates the role of markets as they show that there is 
substantial room for private complementary or supplementary schemes next to the basic 
public scheme.  
 
Moral hazard. Moral hazard is the second type of asymmetric information that is often 
advanced as a reason for public intervention. In the insurance industry, moral hazard arises 
because individuals are able to take hidden actions that have a potential impact on the 
outcome of the insurance problem. 
  
In pensions, one of the most frequently encountered moral hazard problems relates to early 
retirement and has to be seen as a rather striking example of the fact that public intervention 
does not necessarily help. Public insurance systems generally allow for earlier withdrawal 
from the labor force when a person meets some more or less stringent disability criteria. 
Similarly, many European social insurance schemes allow for early withdrawal from the 
labor force when the person works in a company or an industry that undergoes more or less 
severe restructuring. In this situation, there is a substantial risk that workers and their 
employers might find it optimal to reduce the labor supply and demand for older workers in 
order to benefit from these otherwise inaccessible early retirement options.  
 
Myopia and paternalism. Absent any public intervention, some people will simply save 
insufficient amounts. The reasons for this may be multiple, but can summarized as resulting 
for strong preferences for the present. The classical example is clearly myopia that makes 
people over-consume in the short run because they do not attach a (sufficient) value to future 
consumption.  
 
Myopia may clearly be a cause for public intervention when the government takes a 
paternalistic approach and intervenes ex ante to assure that people save sufficiently. Most 
compulsory and structured public retirement income systems would satisfy such a criterion. 
The compulsory membership reduces adverse selection potential but also makes sure 
everybody contributes. The structured benefit claiming and contribution rules ensure a 
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dampening of moral hazard and myopia that would otherwise lead towards under-saving for 
the old age and excessive early retirement behavior.  
 
However, myopia might also justify a different kind of public intervention, namely one that 
works ex post by providing a basic minimum pension benefit, that can either take the form of 
a demogrant for people above a certain age or the form of a means-tested minimum benefit. 
In a recent World Bank publication, Holzmann and Hinz (2005) revise the by now standard 
three-pillared pension structure to integrate a pillar zero. The authors recognize the role of 
such a pillar zero particularly in the developing world, notably because of insufficient 
coverage of segments of the population under any of the other pillars.  
 
But beyond developing countries, the role of a minimum benefit is of an increasing 
importance even in developed countries. In this context, it suffices to refer to the diminished 
role of the universal public pension pillar (pillar 1) in favor of compulsory (pillar 2) or 
voluntary (pillar 3) pensions. Any such shift will no doubt increase the political role of a 
pillar zero, if only because the group of people participating in pillars 2 and 3 is generally 
strictly smaller than the one participating in public sector pillars. 
 
Administrative and decisionmaking costs. Administrative and management costs are an 
important factor influencing the net return that people can earn on their pension assets. 
Similarly, decisionmaking by individuals is a costly process, both because of the explicit and 
implicit charges that individuals have to face when acquiring the necessary information and 
because of the expenses that pension providers incur to influence this decision.   
 
Public intervention in this area usually takes two forms. The government can require group 
purchases or organize a universal public pension system reducing the cost per contributor 
quite considerably. The underlying logic is one of economies of scale. The second form of 
intervention is regulation of the industry. This may be done by requiring minimum 
information to be revealed to the plan participants or by enforcing caps on the financial 
charges that providers are allowed to charge. Another way of reducing the decisionmaking 
costs has been discussed by Sheshinski (2003). The author concludes that in the presence of 
bounded rationality restrictions on the set of alternatives may produce socially preferable 
outcomes. Along the same lines of bounded rationality, the setting of default options for asset 
allocation in defined contribution plans has been heavily researched topic. (See for example 
Laibson and others, 2003.) 
 
Incomplete financial markets. Under an assumption of perfect capital and financial 
markets, individuals would find optimal tools for protecting themselves against all kinds of 
possible risk. The reality looks somewhat different in the sense that private markets still do 
not provide a full set of products permitting an adequate coverage against a series of risks. 
The most obvious ones are inflation, longevity, and aggregate investment risk against which 
private markets can only offer extremely limited protection. Often, private pension 
arrangements only provide for nominal annuities, hence fully exposing the individual to 
inflation risk. Hence, a role for the public sector might be to explicitly provide such 
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insurance, either by setting up an inflation-proof public pension system or by providing 
private insurers with products to adequately shelter against inflation risk.20 
 
The public sector intervention can also be more subtle. The previously cited Coile and 
others (2002) illustrates such an example, where within the U.S. Social Security scheme a 
marginal annuity market de facto exists because of the possibility to decouple the date of 
retirement and the date of claiming.  
 
 
IV.   PENSION REFORM AND PRA 
Justifications for pension reform proposals abound. The most frequently advanced one refers 
to the profound demographic change that most developed countries are currently going 
through, but clearly limiting the call for reform to this argument would be leaving out some 
other key developments. The present section focuses on three fundamental motivations for 
reform, while the next section addresses some specific design issues that might plead in favor 
or against reform of the current system. 
 
A.   Demographics and PAYG 
When considering the PRA reform proposal from this PAYG point of view, it has to be 
stressed that none of the key aspects of the proposal seems to have a beneficial impact on the 
financial sustainability of the Social Security system as such, since it does not directly affect 
any of the parameters mentioned above. This view is likely to be incomplete. First, there is 
the potential for a direct effect on public finances defined more broadly, as a consequence of 
the difference between the interest rate at which the government borrows money on the 
markets, and the effective interest rate it charges under the claw-back provision to individuals 
that opt for the PRA system. Indirect effects on Social Security are obviously also 
imaginable. One such indirect mechanism could work through the savings channel. If 
aggregate savings actually go up and as a result of this increase in aggregate savings 
aggregate investment in the U.S. economy also goes up, then there is a potential for higher 
wages, which could ceterus paribus lead to higher revenue from contributions. Another 
indirect mechanism could be an increase in the average retirement age, which has beneficial 
implications for the Social Security system given its lack of actuarial neutrality on the margin 
(Gruber and Wise, 1999, 2004, and 2005). Such an increase in the average retirement age 
could result as a direct consequence of the desire of people to continue to contribute to the 
system with its low administrative charges and well-regulated products, hence making them 
retire later. Similarly, it might happen that individuals will want to work longer to make up 
for a possible bad draw in terms of the performance of their PRA in earlier working life. 
 
                                                 
20 The optimal allocation of longevity risk is also limited by market incompleteness. Visco (2006) discusses 
some recent developments on the market for longevity-based financial instruments and reports the introduction 
of the first mortality-related bonds. 
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It should be pointed out that a demographic aging process does not per se mean that a crisis 
or a reform of a pension system are inevitable. The differentiation between the terms crisis 
and reform is made on purpose. Demographic change is not inevitably going to result in a 
crisis of any kind of pension system. Theoretically, at the very least, it is imaginable to have 
a pension system that is built on structures that are capable of coping with the demographic 
challenges from within, simply by obeying a set of rules that are not exposed to the above-
mentioned risks. This could notably be the case in a system where the monthly benefits paid 
out to retirees decrease automatically as life expectancy increases. A prime example is the 
Swedish Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) social insurance scheme, where benefits are 
life-expectancy-linked and, thus, the system is sheltered against increases in longevity. But 
even under such a crisis-proof system, the country might face pressure towards reform as a 
result of demographic aging. Expressed differently, though fiscal soundness may insure the 
survival of the pension system itself, it may equally give rise to calls for reform if it involves 
socially unacceptable outcomes in terms of old-age income and consumption levels and 
distribution.  
 
Equally, it should be noted that the above demographic challenges are by no means limited to 
the domain of PAYG systems and extend to both DB and DC plans. The problems of some 
U.S. DB plans can serve as an example. Some companies have to make up for their pension 
funds funding shortages at times where their ratio of workers to pensioners has dropped to 
levels well below 1, hence threatening both the existence of the company and the financial 
situation of the pension fund.  
 
But even DC plans are fundamentally exposed to demographic risk as the returns on the 
assets of the system are influenced by the shape of the labor force. To see the relevance of 
this point, it is easiest to first focus on a closed economy setting. As the demographic 
transition occurs, there will be a period characterized by a relative abundance of capital with 
respect to labor, and hence relatively low returns on the capital. Börsch-Supan and 
others (2002) show that such an effect can be absorbed with capital exports to foreign 
countries facing a different timing of their demographic transition. Jousten and Legros (2005) 
illustrate that a demographic shock affecting two countries that differ in the way their 
pension systems are financed will cause the country with the capitalization system to bear 
some of the transition burden of the PAYG country through international capital flows. 
IMF (2004) concludes that the existing empirical and theoretical literature suggest that baby 
boomers’ retirement behavior may well cause stock prices to be adversely affected, with the 
obvious consequences in terms of the retirement wealth individuals would dispose of. 
Similarly, the equity premium, i.e., the excess risk-adjusted return of stocks over bonds, may 
equally be affected. 
 
B.   Individual Savings and Returns 
Faced with the risk of lower benefits from the PAYG system, an often recommended strategy 
is to make sure that individuals put more resources aside for their retirement. Such a strategy 
can be attained either by encouraging people to save more, or to purchase more annuity 
products. Both strategies involve shifting net resources in present discounted value terms 
towards the future and are based on the idea that rates of return on such products would be 
higher than those in a PAYG system. Geanakoplos and others (1998) analyzed the question 
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and found evidence that such a situation cannot be taken for granted in reality. Hence, one 
way of approaching the PRA proposal is to analyze whether it actually generates a clear-cut 
incentive for such a resource shift to the future.  
 
During the accumulation phase for retirement pensions, defined contribution assets 
accumulate in the worker’s PRA just like any regular savings product. At first sight, the 
major differences with respect to more traditional savings and retirement products are limited 
to the planned complete denial of access to the accumulated resources prior to retirement as 
well as the limitations on withdrawals of the accumulated funds once retired.21 Hence, at first 
sight, the key decision variable in every individual’s financial investment strategy might 
seem to be a comparison between the expected returns earned on other investment products, 
and the return earned on the PRA. 
 
However, when inspecting the product somewhat closer, it becomes clear that this is actually 
the wrong approach to the question, as both products are not really comparable. The most 
striking reason for this is the offsetting rule that leads to a reduction of Social Security 
benefits once the worker retires as a function of the contributions diverted away from Social 
Security. Expressed differently, individuals do not only choose between a PRA and another 
investment vehicle, but rather also simultaneously between two different scenarios in terms 
of Social Security benefits. The benefit offset transforms the PRA into something that 
resembles a fixed-interest loan that the worker takes out to invest in the financial markets and 
that has to be reimbursed later on in life. To be a bit more precise, the worker obtains a loan 
of an amount equal to the diverted contributions from the Social Security Administration. 
The interest rate on the loan corresponds to the interest rate which the administration uses in 
its actuarial calculations at age 65, thus, in the above-mentioned example close to 3 percent.22 
According to the administration’s reform proposal, this loan is repayable after retirement 
through monthly repayments under the form of foregone Social Security benefits.  
 
The key problem that the contributing PRA investor faces can be rephrased as a risk-return 
tradeoff. Risk-averse fully rational PRA investors will only be willing to participate in this 
loan-investment alternative if the expected average return is sufficiently strong to 
compensate for the extra risk that the person takes with respect to the alternative which is an 
absence of participation in the scheme. Shiller (2005) addresses this question for various 
asset portfolios. Using a simulation approach, he shows that there is a substantial risk of 
obtaining a lower return in the PRA than the interest rate that is used in the offset calculation. 
Further, he finds that under conservative assumptions on the returns in line with historical 
international returns, the median rate of return would actually be lower than the rate used for 
                                                 
21 As the share of retirement income out of investment-based individual accounts increases—such as under the 
PRA proposal—the denial of access and the protection of the accumulated funds becomes an ever more 
important question. 
22 The relevant interest rate in the decision problem above depends both on the announced rate, as well as on the 
question of whether diverted contributions have to be paid out of PRA accounts of people that die before 
retirement. 
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computing the offset. The latter finding would, thus, involve risk-taking while at the same 
time giving up average returns, a clearly suboptimal strategy.  
 
The proposed option of a government bond fund with a guaranteed rate of return above 
inflation would seem to be an exception to this rule of risk-return tradeoff. All other things 
equal, individuals would mechanically prefer to invest a maximum in this asset for a rate of 
return that is higher than the one used in the offset calculation. The opposite would be true if 
the return is smaller. This type of corner solution actually points to an interesting problem. If, 
on the one hand, the rate that is used in the offset calculation is set once and for all in 
advance, while the rate of return on these inflation protected bonds likely continues to 
fluctuates with the market, we should observe a large degree of instability in the incentive to 
participate in the PRA. Expressed differently, when market long-term interest rates change, 
so do the incentives to take the once-and-for-all decision to participate in the program. If, on 
the other hand, the rate used for the offset calculation actually varies with the market rate it 
raises an interesting question for both risk-free and risk-taking investment strategies. 
Effectively, the PRA investors would not only possibly face risk on the return side of their 
investment, but also interest rate risk on the loan side of the problem. For the special case of 
co-movement of the interest on indexed bonds and the interest used for the offset calculation, 
this point actually leads to a fundamental question, namely why these two rates would be 
different. Indeed, any difference will lead to mechanical behavior involving either a 
mechanical subsidy of the government to the individual (when the rate on bonds is higher), a 
mechanical refusal of the individual to participate (when it is smaller), or a complete 
indifference on the pure basis of rates of return.23 
 
Hence, to sum up, the choice of participation in the PRA program essentially reduces to a bet 
on future returns on the financial markets. The ensuing effect in terms of additional resources 
does not, thus, necessarily lead to a net shift of resources towards the future due to the 
suggested offsetting rule after retirement. 
 
Quite to the contrary, the literature on IRA and 401(k) retirement savings indicates that such 
a policy might end up decreasing the resources allocated to the future. The logic is simple: 
faced with a higher nominal PRA account balance, individuals might be tempted to 
(completely) undo the effect of increased PRA savings by reducing their alternative savings 
efforts as they may see PRA assets as substitutes for other retirement assets.24 Even though 
such a strategy may be completely misguided from a purely financial point of view, the risk 
is nonetheless very real as people might underestimate the liability of reduced future Social 
Security benefits they incur when entering the PRA system. 
                                                 
23 However, even when rates of return are equal, this does not mean that people do not have strong preferences 
for either one alternative, purely based on the very different rules with respect to annuitization, spousal, and 
survivor benefits, just to cite a few examples. 
24 The classical references are Gale and Scholz (1994) and Poterba and others (1996). Using the same data, the 
former found no net effect of IRA tax incentives on savings whereas the latter found a positive effect.  
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C.   Increased Aggregate Savings 
Faced with the demographic challenge to the PAYG-financed Social Security program, the 
ensuing observation of need for action should not, thus, be seen as a surprise. The same 
probably also holds true for the tendency to move towards a capitalized system given the 
nowadays generally higher returns on capitalization systems as compared to PAYG systems. 
At the aggregate level, the tendency to shift towards a savings-based system is a somewhat 
less obvious case to make. 
 
Neoclassical growth theory relies heavily on the link between savings, investment, and the 
growth of the economy. In a closed economy setting, it can be shown that an economy that 
increases its savings rate will in the long-run access to a higher level of output per worker 
while having an unchanged long-term growth rate. The result implies that any positive 
growth effects of additional savings are only observable during a transition period and 
perpetuate themselves in a level effect but not a rate of growth effect.  
 
The situation is slightly different in an open economy setting, such as the one of the 
United States, where any insufficiency of national savings can be compensated by imported 
savings from abroad. Within the context of the proposed U.S. reform, it is worth noting that a 
stimulation of aggregate savings does not necessarily imply higher Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth, but clearly implies a somewhat less marked reliance on capital imports from 
abroad. Whereas this might be a worthy aim in itself, it has to be dissociated from any pure 
growth considerations. But in spite of these unambiguous results in terms of output, 
excessive savings may actually reduce the long run steady state consumption levels of 
individuals. 
 
Beyond these long run considerations, it is important to emphasize that any increase in 
aggregate savings will, in the immediate term, lead to lowered private and/or public 
consumption (see Burtless, 2001). The rationale behind this logic is simple. For a given GDP 
level at the point of departure, it is only possible to increase savings if somebody’s 
consumption decreases. A first example would be to cut retirement benefits to those currently 
on Social Security while at the same time keeping the Social Security contribution rate 
unchanged. Such a strategy would improve the public sector’s balance sheet and lead to 
higher public sector savings, and thus higher national savings. A similar effect could be 
attained if the PRA were conceived as a complement to current Social Security contributions 
rather than the proposed substitution. 
 
Two other mechanisms may also influence the level of aggregate savings. First, making 
implicit government debt explicit could affect the spending and savings behavior of the 
public sector if only by making the intertemporal budget constraint more explicit and 
transparent. Second, the introduction of a PRA or any other form of retirement savings 
device could generate fresh additional net savings at the individual level, which would 
increase private savings. Engen and Gale (1997) find that though increased prefunding of 
(public) pension liabilities is a necessary condition for increased national savings, it is by no 
means a sufficient condition as private savings does not necessarily increase in line with 
increased public dissaving. As discussed before, the PRA proposal is unlikely to deliver on 
these margins, as the increase in private savings under the form of PRA is mechanically 
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undone by a decrease in public sector savings due to the need for issuing bonds to finance the 
transition. While the precise net savings effect of the PRA are hard to predict, it is likely that 
they are going to be small in absolute value. 
 
D.   Accounting for Private Sector Pensions 
In the private sector, accounting rules for pensions have recently undergone some significant 
changes. The most prominent change is no doubt the progressive introduction of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for listed companies in a long series of 
countries, and more particularly the accounting standard known as IAS 19 that deals with 
pension liabilities of companies.25 In the United States the existing accounting standards 
(FASB 87) are largely consistent with the current version of IAS 19. Whereas previously 
national governments applied very different rules to their companies, IAS 19 represents a 
first attempt towards a common way of treating pension liabilities. Key to IAS 19 is the 
concept of “constructive obligation.” This term is meant to precisely go beyond the purely 
legal aspects of enforceability of claim and considers that companies have to account for 
claims that represent “an obligation that derives from an enterprise action where: (a) by an 
established pattern of past practices, published policies, or a sufficiently specific current 
statement, the enterprise has indicated to other parties that it will accept certain 
responsibilities; and, (b), as a result, the enterprise has created a valid expectation on the 
part of other parties that it will discharge these responsibilities.”26 
 
In this sense, IAS 19 positions itself somewhere in between the notion of a pure promise 
without any backing and a legally recognized future claim. Yermo (2003) discusses some of 
the practical difficulties that arise when classifying pension plans in various countries. By 
their very nature, pure defined contribution plans, where the employer’s role is strictly 
limited to the original contribution without any obligation for result, do not have to be 
accounted for in corporate accounts, as they do not comprise an obligation on behalf of the 
company. As soon as there is deviation from a pure defined contribution plan, the pension 
plan theoretically becomes IAS 19 relevant. Under IAS 19, companies are required to 
provision for future benefit liabilities. If the plan is based on final salaries, companies have to 
project the liabilities on the basis of projected wages instead of current wages. Further, assets 
valuation has to be based on market values and benefit obligations have to be discounted 
using current market rates for a similar duration as the pension promises, hence implying 
volatility in balance sheet liabilities.27 
 
                                                 
25 For European Union countries, the so-called IAS Regulation (EC)1606/2002 concerning the application of 
international accounting standards was adopted on July 19, 2002 by the European Parliament and the Council.  
26 See Lequillier (2004). 
27 One “insurance” strategy to escape the volatility would, thus, be to invest in long-term bonds such as to have 
assets and liabilities move in parallel. 
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E.   Accounting for Public Sector Pensions 
The contrast between the way pension liabilities in private and public pension schemes are 
accounted for is at the center of some recent research, but also of some recent political 
decisionmaking. Pitzer (2002) and Oksanen (2004) address the question of a more 
comprehensive accounting for pension liabilities. Apart from a general aim of setting the 
public and private sectors on equal footing, an important practical reason also exists: pension 
liabilities are sometimes shifted from a corporation to the government against a 
compensatory payment, often a lump-sum. By doing so, companies are able to offload their 
pension liabilities and risks to a government entity. Such a transaction clearly satisfies all 
characteristics of a purchase of an insurance contract, as it means offloading risk against 
payment of a “premium.” On the government side, demand for such transaction simply stems 
from the fact that they can usually book the lump-sum as current income in the yearly 
budget, while at the same time not having to recognize the implicit pension liability 
anywhere. 
 
The pending introduction of IAS 19 has clearly played the role of a catalyst in this domain. 
The most recent example is no doubt the harmonization and the transfer of the banking 
sector’s pension plans in Greece just prior to the introduction of IFRS in Greece at the end of 
June. As a result of the reform, a government entity has taken over formal pension 
obligations eliminating the otherwise inevitable requirement to include these pension 
liabilities on the balance sheet. Other examples of such “pension deals” abound, such as the 
sale by the Belgian telecoms group Belgacom of its statutory employees’ first pillar pension 
plan to the Belgian state in late 2003 against a cash payment of EUR 5 billion as a 
compensation for pension liabilities resulting from past earnings. This sale can be seen as an 
important step on the way to the IPO of Belgacom stock on the Euronext stock exchange in 
early 2004. 
 
Two interesting parallels come to mind when thinking about the PRA proposal. First, the 
offloading of pension liabilities onto a government entity has an impact on the implicit and 
the explicit debt levels that the public sector faces. While the choice of the these “pension 
deals” of European governments are largely motivated by an objective of reduction of current 
explicit debt levels (for example to satisfy the Maastricht debt criteria), the logic of the PRA 
proposal seems just to be the opposite, namely making implicit debt explicit. In line with the 
previous discussion, this shift of emphasis from one type of debt to the other should clearly 
be expected to have implications for future policy choices. These effects can be expected to 
go well beyond the already discussed savings effects as implicit debt seems to be much easier 
to adjust and renege than explicit one. Expressed differently, keeping pension promises 
implicit rather than making them explicit and legally enforceable appears like an important 
economic policy tool in its own right. 
 
The second parallel relates to the fact that in neither case is there a fundamental change in the 
net pension liabilities of the economy as a whole, neither at present, nor in the future. The 
key change that is taking place is purely a change in the allocation of risk among the different 
actors in the economy. A common feature of the two types of reforms is that both PRA and 
“pension deals” shift risk away from the corporate sector. The receiving entity is however 
different under the two alternatives. “Pension deals” shift the pension risk from some specific 
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companies or sectors to the public sector. PRAs shift risk away from the employers and the 
public sector to individuals as PRA are pure DC vehicles, as opposed to the fundamentally 
DB based structure of Social Security. Under the rules of Social Security, future contribution 
hikes cannot be ruled out on an a priori basis. The shift to PRA would make such hikes less 
likely as the share of contributions going towards the accounts would largely not benefit from 




V.   FURTHER DESIGN ISSUES 
Beyond these often discussed motivations for reform, pension reform usually has 
implications on a series of other factors, which are often left out of the public debate. The 
discussion below focuses on a few considerations relying both on international experience 
and on the lessons from the private pensions sector. The motivation for this emphasis on 
particular design issues basically boils down to a profound belief that these issues are of such 
a scope that they can fundamentally alter the judgment on the desirability of the current 
system and of proposed reforms thereto.  
 
A.   The Problem of Early Retirement 
At a time when demographic factors are threatening the PAYG financed public pension 
systems, many countries are exposed to a second and this time purely behavioral trend that 
reinforces the above-mentioned pressures. The most immediate indicators of increased early 
retirement behavior are no doubt the substantial fall in average retirement ages around the 
developed world, sometimes reaching levels as low as 58 years in some European countries. 
Falling participation rates reveal yet another view of the same problem.28  
 
At the root of this trend towards earlier retirement lie strong incentives that both the workers 
and the employers often face to leave the labor force early. These incentives were first 
documented in an internationally harmonized form by the different contributors to the Gruber 
and Wise (1999) volume. In the U.S. context, Gruber and Wise (1999) document a rather 
striking finding of actuarial neutrality of the Social Security system for average- or median-
career paths. As such, this result would imply the absence of incentives for early retirement 
stemming from the side of the public retirement system. However, even in the U.S. context 
there is some level of early exit from the labor force as Herbertsson and Orszag (2001) show. 
One of the factors that help square these two observations is the heterogeneity in the 
population leading towards stronger incentives for early exit for some, while leading to 
strong incentives to stay on for others. Another factor is no doubt the presence of sometimes 
heavy incentives towards early retirement under some private pension arrangements.29 
                                                 
28 See Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998). 
29 The most obvious case is the one where the private scheme compensates the worker for any actuarial 
reduction factor the individual might be exposed to when retiring early under the provisions of the public 
scheme.  
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The strong incentives towards early retirement usually go well beyond the pure limits of 
retirement income systems, be they public or private. Often, other programs covering 
secondary risks such as sickness, disability, and unemployment play a major role in the 
incentives people face. First of all, access to these systems may not necessarily be closely 
monitored at all times, possibly leading to higher take-up, and ultimately earlier withdrawal 
from the labor force. The Belgian unemployment insurance and the Dutch disability 
insurance are no doubt the classical examples of programs, which have been partly diverted 
from their original objectives to serve as early retirement pathways by providing financial 
resources to early retirees not yet eligible for regular retirement benefits. A second and linked 
effect of these systems is that individuals who experience spells on these replacement income 
systems are often sheltered from a negative impact on their regular pension by a total waiver 
on contributions during these spells while continuing to enjoy full benefit accrual as if they 
had worked. Last but not least, such secondary-risk programs also often allow individuals to 
escape the effect of early retirement penalties that would be applicable under the regular 
pension scheme. 
 
While the financial implications of the purely demographic challenges are rather well 
understood, the same clearly does not hold true for the overall costs of the early retirement 
programs. The explicit and implicit costs of early retirement programs are often hard to 
evaluate as they are willingly or unwillingly split among a series of different actors and 
budgets. In an interesting study, Herbertsson and Orszag (2001) computed the cost of the use 
of early retirement provisions as a fraction of potential GDP that the country could attain 
with full use of their productive capacities, hence also the older workers. They document that 
the implicit cost of early retirement behavior amounts to a stunning 15 percent of potential 
GDP in the case of Hungary and Belgium, whereas it is closer to 5 percent for the United 
States, Sweden, and New Zealand. 
 
A move towards PRA’s will likely have consequences in terms of the skewed incentives 
individuals face towards earlier retirement under the current Social Security and other private 
pension rules. First, given that PRA are purely optional, the risk-pool of people selecting to 
participate in PRA will likely not correspond to the risk pool of people in the population at 
large. This selection will undoubtedly lead to different pricing patterns than those implicitly 
applicable within the scope of Social Security. Second, given that everybody does not have to 
annuitize, this selection will only be reinforced. By allowing this double selection into 
annuities, the proposal sacrifices the key advantage of mandatory annuitization. It gives 
every individual the option of converting to an (imperfect) annuity, thus, in some sense, fully 
subjecting the market to adverse selection through strategic annuitization. All else equal, 
people with a higher life expectancy have a bigger incentive to convert their lump-sum asset 
holdings into annuity payout streams than people in a worse physical condition.  
 
The option not to annuitize may actually lead to an even more striking outcome. 
Theoretically, it is very plausible to argue that the introduction of PRA may cause some 
individuals with a strong preference for the present (myopia,…) to opt for the PRA, even in 
the presence of a weaker rate of return profile. Though this might arguably be considered a 
purely individual financial decision, it remains a rather odd side-effect within a retirement 
savings proposal.  
  27
 
But even from a more macroeconomic point of view such a shift towards PRA and the 
ensuing individual reoptimization will no doubt have substantial effects, as it reforms the 
pension landscape by leaving the insurance programs for some other secondary risks 
unchanged. One such link is illustrated by Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) who show the 
close interaction between Social Security’s old-age and disability insurance programs. The 
paper shows that changes in the level and the award frequency of disability benefits have a 
strong effect on early retirement behavior under the old-age insurance program. 
 
B.   Economics of Guarantees 
Pensions are often associated with the need for some form of protection mechanism in order 
to make sure that the benefits satisfy at least some minimum criteria. Such protection 
mechanisms can be organized within a given pension income system but obviously also 
outside of the strict limits of such a system. For example, most developed countries have 
some sort of dedicated public old-age income support system set up to cater the needs of 
elderly people not benefiting from sufficient other income source.  
 
The issue of guarantees arises equally in the context of public and private programs and in 
DB and DC systems. The guarantee is usually rather explicit in a pure DB plan. But even 
many other types of plans contain some guarantees. While many possible forms exist, they 
can be classified into two broad categories: minimum benefits and rate of return guarantees. 
 
Minimum benefit guarantees essentially boil down to the very basic idea of a social safety 
net. Applied to the field of private pensions, it corresponds to a tool ensuring that people do 
not find themselves with insufficient resources in retirement, independently of their 
investment strategies. This type of guarantee is frequently used in countries that rely 
predominantly on investment-based systems, like for example Chile. Countries with a 
substantial public system usually do not have major minimum benefit guarantees applicable 
to private pensions, simply because the public first pillar systems in some sense play that 
role. 
 
Minimum rate of return guarantees on the other hand are designed to shield people more 
generally against investment risk independently of their position in the income or wealth 
distribution. These guarantees can be applied either on a purely annual basis, or alternatively 
at the final term of the product.  
 
When confronted with a final term guarantee, the guarantee only plays either at retirement, 
death or exit from the pension plan and thus exposes the individual account holder to 
different risks. First, it makes it very hard for the individual worker to follow the evolution of 
his pension wealth. Expressed differently, if the returns are bigger than the guaranteed rate in 
one year, this does not mean that the affiliate will automatically benefit from this excess 
return as the excess could as well help to make up for the insufficient return of another past 
or future year.  
 
Second, the legally mandated guarantee mechanism does not assure the pensioner that he will 
actually benefit from the announced rate of return until retirement, as such mechanisms 
  28
generally allow for a revision of the guaranteed rate when market conditions change 
substantially.30 The guarantee may thus suffer form the absence of formal and enforceable 
commitment to make it credible as it is subject to change in the future political process. Such 
a guarantee thus represents from the very outset an inherent implicit financial risk for the 
individual affiliate as the true economic value of the guarantee is uncertain until the 
guarantee comes to play at exit, retirement, or death. 
 
Guarantees suffer from severe moral hazard problems, as people might be induced to 
excessive risk-taking by the pure presence of these insurance mechanisms. The risk-taking 
might even be reinforced by the presence of some other social programs. For example, it is 
not uncommon to find more generous health-related benefits for the elderly linked to income 
testing in retirement, as for example happens under the U.S. Medicaid program. Any such 
link obviously reinforces the moral hazard involved. Different alternatives are imaginable to 
contain the moral hazard in the area of private pension savings, such as simply restricting 
peoples’ investment choices to a limited set of pre-selected portfolios. Another way of coping 
with the moral hazard problems is to completely sever the link between the insured amount 
and the actual investment behavior of the person. This latter policy would imply basing the 
insurance coverage not on observed risk, but rather on the performance of a hypothetical 
portfolio that has a moderate risk. By doing so, people continue to benefit from insurance 
against general market reversals, whereas at the same time fully assuming the economic and 
financial consequences of individual deviations from such a “conservative” portfolio. 
 
Both guarantee mechanisms also clearly come at an economic cost to the affiliate or the 
taxpayer, as there is no such thing as a free lunch. Expressed differently, if the guarantee 
actually represents a real protection for the individual, then it has to be that it is somehow 
implicitly or explicitly priced. Explicit pricing would occur if the individual or the pension 
organization would buy coverage against downward risk from an insurer or under the form of 
an option contract on the financial markets. Implicit pricing occurs when no such purchase 
takes place and the coverage is simply reflected in the return structure that the individual 
faces on his pension assets, or in a higher tax burden elsewhere to finance an independent 
social safety net. Lachance and Mitchell (2003) use an option valuation technique to infer the 
cost of an explicit guarantee provided by a pension fund itself and show that the costs are 
very substantial when portfolios are heavily invested in stocks rather than bonds. Their 
intuition is simple: stocks have a higher volatility and, thus, a higher chance of activating the 
guarantee than bonds. A corollary of the result is that increasing the share of bonds reduces 
the cost of the guarantee. In terms of the pension policy of a plan sponsor offering such a 
guarantee, the findings of Lachance and Mitchell (2003) imply that they might have an 
incentive to opt for more conservative fund strategies and more insurance to diminish the 
likelihood of having to top fund assets in the future, thus significantly reducing the range of 
assets returns potentially accessible to the individual pensioners.  
 
                                                 
30 See for example the Belgian law on complementary pension that allows for a revision of the future 
guaranteed rate of return. 
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The proposed PRA would not provide any explicit guarantee. Hence, individuals are fully 
exposed to investment risk, as their benefits will be reduced according to a formula where 
effectively observed returns do not matter. While the offsetting with a fixed interest rate 
clearly eliminates all potential for moral hazard, it also eliminates any kind of insurance 
mechanism against bad investment draws on the side of the individual. 
 
C.   Who Guarantees Private Sector Pensions? 
Three broad categories of entities can issue guarantees: the employer in the case of a 
workplace-related pension, the pension fund and the public sector. As discussed below, the 
distinction between these three is crucial as they imply very different outcomes both in terms 
of the value of the guarantee and the way it affects the different entities concerned. 
 
When the guarantee only plays at exit, retirement, or death, such as with minimum benefit 
guarantees or term rate of return guarantees, any possible shortage of funds only becomes 
apparent at these key stages. This can be problematic. Consider the case of a guarantee issued 
by the employer. If the issuer of the guarantee is still around at that time, this gap-funding 
policy might lead that company towards having to fund gaps of old workers rather than 
spending the money on its current workforce. Expressed differently, there is an 
intergenerational redistributional effect, as the gap between younger workers’ productivity 
and their net wages will have to increase to face the higher financing costs of the retired 
workers’ pension obligations, independently of whether these young workers belong to the 
same pension regime or not. Similar intergenerational redistribution arises when the issuer of 
the guarantee is the pension fund rather than the employer, with this time redistribution 
occurring from young plan affiliates towards retirees.  
 
But the issuer of the guarantee might equally no longer be around or not have the necessary 
financial clout to face the burden at the time the gap has to be bridged. This means that the 
guarantee could ultimately either be completely worthless or ultimately be borne by some 
public entity that is playing the role of guarantor of last resort. Real-world examples of the 
latter system abound, as governments usually try to increase the confidence in the system by 
complementing privately issued guarantees by a backup provision by a public or quasi-public 
authority, either financed through some insurance premium levied on the covered amounts or 
out of general government revenue. The rationale for such an institution is most easily 
understood when thinking about aggregate risks that private insurance companies cannot 
adequately shelter their customers against.  
 
In the United States, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) plays this role of 
public stabilizer for most defined benefit and cash-balance plans.31 The PBGC was created by 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The aim was to encourage growth of 
                                                 
31 American defined contribution plans are not covered by this insurance given that investment risk is entirely 
borne by the plan participants, in line with the definition of such plans by the OECD. Some European countries 
divert from these pure principles by imposing minimum rate of return guarantees on products that are also 
broadly classified as defined contribution plans. 
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defined benefit pension plans, to provide timely and uninterrupted payment of pension 
benefits and to keep pension insurance premiums at a minimum. The entity is financed by 
means of compulsory contributions of all plans eligible for coverage under the PBGC terms.32 
The PBGC arguably leads to moral hazard in the retirement income market in line with 
experience from deposit insurance schemes applicable to bank savings accounts. It can easily 
lead to excessive risk-taking and too frequent reliance on the guarantee. Expressed 
differently, the PBGC may eliminate the negative consequences of default risk for current 
and future pensioners by generating systematic risk-overexposure of pension funds and hence 
creating a new kind of aggregate risk.  
 
The recent past can serve as an illustration of this principle. After a series of corporate 
failures and restructurings, the PBGC’s net position has been seriously challenged as it has to 
assume the financial responsibility for pension fund shortages. PBGC (2005) documents that 
over the last 4 years, the net balance sheet (assets minus liabilities) of the PBGC has 
worsened dramatically to an approximate negative value of US$24 billion in 2004, with the 
numbers having taken yet another hit in 2005 with the takeover of the under-funded pension 
plan of United Airlines. In the face of this risk of an outright financial failure of the PBGC, 
various proposals to revamp the system have been advanced, aiming at a lower risk exposure 
of the entity that many companies have simply used as a cheap way to get rid of under-
funded pension schemes. The 2006 Pension Protection Act tries to address some of these 
concerns by reducing incentives to under-fund defined benefit pension plans and increasing 
incentives for increased savings in defined contribution plans. 
 
However, the guarantee of the PBGC is not complete on at least two accounts. First, the 
guarantee applies only up to a certain maximum pension amount. Second, the PBGC as a 
separate legal entity from the Federal government does not explicitly benefit from any kind 
of financial guarantee. This lack of an explicit guarantee on behalf of the Federal government 
clearly makes economic sense. If the amounts at stake are simply too big, there is no way the 
government could uphold such a guarantee, as it would itself likely face cash-flow problems.  
 
D.   What About Inflation Risk? 
As noted above, when thinking in terms of a simple life-cycle model allowing for price 
uncertainty, it is easy to show that individuals are interested in stabilizing their real 
consumption levels, not the nominal ones. Economically, it means that people prefer to have 
pension products at their hand that allow them to shelter them from inflation risk causing 
expected and unexpected drops in purchasing power.  
 
To some surprise, such products are rather rare in the real world, when abstracting away from 
public pension systems. Most private plans do not offer indexed pension payments. 
Similarly, pension guarantees do not necessarily extend to the inflation risk. Again, the 
                                                 
32 Pension plans pay the PBGC yearly insurance premia: per worker or retiree in multiemployer plans; per 
worker or retiree plus fraction of unfunded vested benefits in single employer plans.  
  31
PBGC can serve as the best-known example as its guarantee does not extend to the 
indexation of benefits.  
 
Indexation is probably one of the most frequently underestimated risks that individuals face. 
Particularly in times when observed inflation rates are low, people do not pay sufficient 
attention to the fact that inflation works through compounding exactly like interest charges 
do. There is obviously no simple and fast solution to the absence of adequate inflation 
sheltering of private pension products—otherwise the markets would offer such products. 
But it nonetheless raises an interesting social policy issue: in a world where a social and 
political consensus seem to have emerged on an ever increasing role for private pensions, 
should there not be a consensus to facilitate inflation-indexed pension products as the 
pensioners’ gains from such inflation-shielding are so clear?  
 
The pension industry itself might probably not represent the element in the financial chain 
that is best suited for taking on such inflation risk. But other alternatives might be at hand, be 
they under the form of private sector financial contracts designed to shift the risk to entities 
willing to absorb it for an adequate price, or be it under the form of the government offering 
treasury inflation protected securities that could then, in turn, be bought by pension funds to 
protect themselves against price fluctuations.33 Examples of inflation-indexed bonds exist 
(for example in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, or France) but overall this 
financial market segment remains rather small. In both cases, the coverage against the 
inflation risk involves a need for adequate pricing of the risk that these private or public 
entities take on.  
 
 
VI.   CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The present paper started by surveying some of the key elements that one necessarily 
encounters when setting up and running a pension system. The most often cited one is no 
doubt the funding of the scheme and more precisely the PAYG or capitalization basis for the 
pensions. The paper illustrated the link with aggregate savings within the context of the PRA 
proposal and showed that aggregate savings do not necessarily increase as a result of the 
proposed shift towards more capitalization.  
 
While aggregate savings are undoubtedly of a major importance to the economy, the 
emphasis of the paper has been a different one reflecting the view that other factors are 
playing an equally important role while not getting the attention they deserve. All across the 
globe, there seems to be a reallocation of risk towards individuals. Partly under pressure from 
new tighter accounting rules, employers are increasingly trying to offload private workplace-
related pension liabilities from their balance sheet by shifting risks towards governments and 
workers alike.  
 
                                                 
33 The latter scenario would involve present and future taxpayers ultimately bearing the inflation risk. 
  32
The paper emphasizes the crucial role that risk pooling under the form of real annuities plays 
in individual consumption planning. The paper also stresses the importance of imperfections 
that current workers and pensioners alike face, be it because of uncertain returns, lack of 
actuarial neutrality, or because of an insufficient degree of certainty that they face that the 
pension fund they entrusted their money to will ultimately be around or able to stand up to its 
obligations when they will be drawing down their assets in their old ages.  
 
The discussed PRA proposal, though containing an option for a price-indexed pension, does 
not deliver on the other margins. Risk pooling is limited by its voluntary nature. It also 
clearly shifts both investment risk and demographic risk away from the government to those 
individuals who opt for this particular form of voluntary savings accounts. By doing so, the 
proposal reduces the economic value of the real annuity payout stream the individual will be 
entitled to in the future, as he will be facing a large degree of variability in pension payments 
depending on how his pension investment strategy pays off. The proposal does not limit 
potential losses, and thus income variability, to the present discounted value of a worker’s 
payroll taxes going into the PRA. Any shortfall on the PRA side would thus be entirely borne 
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